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Abstract 
 
Autonomous systems are becoming more commonly used, especially in hazardous situations. 
Such systems are expected to make their own decisions about future actions when some 
capabilities degrade due to failures of their subsystems. Such decisions are made without 
human input, therefore they need to be well-informed in a short time when the situation is 
analysed and future consequences of the failure are estimated. The future planning of the 
mission should take account of the likelihood of mission failure. The reliability analysis for 
autonomous systems can be performed using the methodologies developed for phased mission 
analysis, where the causes of failure for each phase in the mission can be expressed by fault 
trees.   
 
Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) are of a particular interest in the aeronautical 
industry, where it is a long term ambition to operate them routinely in civil airspace. Safety is 
the main requirement for the UAV operation and the calculation of failure probability of each 
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phase and the overall mission is the topic of this paper. When components or sub-systems fail 
or environmental conditions throughout the mission change, these changes can affect the 
future mission. The new proposed methodology takes into account the available diagnostics 
data and is used to predict future capabilities of the UAV in real-time. Since this methodology 
is based on the efficient BDD method, the quickly provided advice can be used in making 
decisions. When failures occur appropriate actions are required in order to preserve safety of 
the autonomous vehicle. The overall decision making strategy for autonomous vehicles is 
explained in this paper. Some limitations of the methodology are discussed and further 
improvements are presented based on experimental results.   
 
Keywords: phased mission, autonomous system, fault tree, binary decision diagram, 
reliability 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A phased mission describes a situation when the requirements for success change throughout 
the time of operation, therefore, the causes of failure during the mission also change. The 
consecutive and distinct periods in the mission performing different tasks are known as 
phases, performed in sequence. In order for the mission to be successful, each of the phases 
must be completed successfully, therefore, the mission fails if at least one phase fails. Many 
systems operate in this way, with a typical example being an aircraft flight, containing a 
number of phases, such as: taxi, take-off, climb to required altitude, cruise, descend, landing 
and taxi back to the terminal. The mission can fail in any of the phases and the purpose of the 
analysis is to predict phase failure probabilities, which are added to obtain the overall mission 
failure probability. 
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Autonomous systems are becoming increasingly useful in today's society because they can 
operate in conditions which would be risky for humans. For such autonomous systems the 
requirement is placed on the system to make its own decisions, without human help, at 
different stages of the mission. These decisions about immediate or future actions must be 
well-informed, considering the risk related to the platform itself and objects located close to 
the location of the platform. The rational decisions are expected to preserve the safety of the 
operation and achieve the mission success. 
 
A significant factor in the decision making process of autonomous systems is the mission 
failure probability during the future phases. There are two types of predictions required ± 
before the start of the mission and while the mission is in progress. The initial mission failure 
probability, that determines if the mission should start in the current system configuration, 
changes throughout the course of the mission. The updates are calculated when certain phases 
have been completed successfully and some components that affect the requirements of phase 
success have failed. If the updated failure probability is unacceptably high, the mission cannot 
proceed in its current configuration and alternatives should be used. An example of such an 
alternative for a UAV could be landing in a different airport than that initially intended. One 
of the requirements for this strategy is to be able to adapt rapidly to changing mission 
environment and diagnostics data, which report the status of components, functions or 
subsystems. Therefore, a prognostics tool is expected to provide accurate information in a 
short time so that the decision making process would be well-informed and appropriate 
decisions would be made before a catastrophic event.  
 
Previously developed risk assessment methods are used in the phased mission analysis. Fault 
tree analysis is suitable when describing non-repairable systems in [1], [2] and [3], where 
component failures are treated independently. Fault trees code the failure logic in a well-
documented way, however, their limitations become apparent when performing the 
 4 
quantitative analysis. Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) were developed as an alternative 
logic function representation in [4], [5] and [6]. Due to the efficiency of the analysis method 
for BDDs they have also been applied to phased mission analysis, such as [7] and [8]. Also, 
prior to fault tree conversion to BDD fault tree simplifications can be applied, as shown in [9] 
and [10], which result in a more concise fault tree form. These techniques can be also applied 
to phase fault trees, where independent modules are identified, resulting in smaller fault trees 
and BDDs. This approach is applied in the proposed methodology.   
 
A mission planning strategy is presented in this paper, which is based on using the 
prognostics methodology for autonomous vehicles (primarily UAVs) performing phased 
missions. The ability to calculate the initial mission failure probability [11] is now enhanced 
to calculate the updated mission failure probability, when new information about the health of 
the system and operational conditions is obtained. This contribution is particularly important 
if the phased mission modelling is to be applied as a prognostics tool in the mission planning 
of autonomous vehicles. In such application the mission failure probability is revaluated 
throughout the mission according to fault diagnostics information. The novelty of this method 
is its simplicity when connecting phase failure BDDs and its ability to take into account not 
only system components (single/multiple failure mode) but also external factors. In addition, 
this paper shows how to calculate the updated future phase failure probabilities after each 
phase is completed successfully. Such analysis is possible, since not only the overall mission 
failure probability but also each phase failure probabilities are calculated using this method. 
Also, the increased efficiency of the BDD technique for predictions of mission failure 
probability is achieved, when phase fault trees are simplified prior to the conversion to BDDs. 
A fast and efficient phased mission reliability analysis can be used to support the decision 
making process of autonomous vehicles.  
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2. Phased Mission Modelling 
 
Phased missions are used to define the behaviour of a system during different parts of the 
mission and to perform the analysis. The following characteristics determine a phased 
mission: 
x Every mission consists of many consecutive phases performed in sequence.  
x Since a different task is to be performed in each phase there are different failure 
criteria in each phase. 
x For a mission to be successful all phases must be completed successfully. 
 
Further assumptions are made in this paper. First of all, the length of each phase is known. 
Secondly, before the start of the mission all components are considered to be working. And 
finally, since the non-repairable mission is considered component failures remain present in 
the system after they have happened. 
 
Figure 1 ± Fault tree for mission failure in phase i, Phi 
The phased mission is represented by a number of fault trees, each of them expressing the 
conditions leading to the failure of a phase. For any phase the method, proposed in [8], 
combines the causes of success of previous phases with the causes of failure for the phase 
being considered. A general fault is shown in Figure 1. As it can be seen from the diagram, 
Mission Fails 
in  phase i 
Failure 
conditions are 
met in phase 1 
Failure 
conditions are 
met in phase i-1 
Failure conditions 
were not met in 
previous phases 
Failure 
conditions are 
met in phase i 
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the mission failure logic in phase i is expressed as a conjunction of failure conditions NOT 
being met in any of the previous phases i ± 1 and the failure conditions met in phase i. Let F i 
express the logical expression for the failure conditions being met in phase i and Phi express 
the logical expression for mission failure in phase i. Then:. 
iii FFFFFPh
FPh
 
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Fault tree analysis can be used to quantify the probability of mission failure during mission 
phase i, Qi: 
 ii PhPQ  . (2) 
Since the mission fails if at least one of its phases fail, the logical expression for mission 
failure is given by PhMISS: 
321
PhPhPhPhMISS  ...  (3) 
The total mission failure probability, QMISS, is obtained by adding these mission phase failure 
probabilities, as shown in equation (4): 
¦n
=i
iMISS Q=Q
1
, (4) 
where n is the total number of phases in the mission. Since the conditional phase failures are 
mutually exclusive events the total mission failure probability is simply the sum of mission 
phase failure probabilities.  
 
Once the mission is underway, Qi is updated taking into account the success of the previous 
phases. 8VLQJ%D\HV¶WKHRUHPJLYHVWKHH[SUHVVLRQWRFDOculate the updated phase failure 
probability, k|jQ , the probability of failure in phase j given that phase k was successfully 
completed, as shown in [12]: 
.
¦ k
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i
j
k|j
Q
Q
=Q
1
1
 (5) 
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Then the overall mission failure probability is calculated by adding the phase failure 
probabilities of the future phases.  
.¦n
+k=j k|jkMISS
Q=Q
1
 (6) 
This concludes the basic phased mission modelling which is going to be extended for 
autonomous vehicles.  
 
3. Mission Planning for Autonomous Vehicles 
 
A decision making strategy which can be used in mission planning for autonomous vehicles 
performing phased missions is presented in this section. This approach is based on the 
probability of mission failure, which is calculated before the mission starts, and then it is 
updated throughout the course of the mission. These are explained below together with the 
requirements for the implementation of the strategy.   
 
3.1. Types of mission failure probability 
 
There are two different probabilities that are required to be calculated during the course of the 
mission. These are the initial mission failure probability and the updated mission failure 
probability. The initial mission failure probability is calculated once, before the start of the 
mission. It gives the likelihood of the mission failure if the current system and mission 
configuration is used. The updated failure probability can be calculated many times during the 
mission, for example, after each successfully completed phase. Also as failures occur, as 
indicated for example by a fault detection system, the updated failure probability gives the 
indication of how likely is the future mission to failure, when certain failures occur. It is also 
appropriate if environmental conditions change during the mission.  
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The mission failure probability is the key factor in the mission planning process, presented in 
the following section. The two types of probability are calculated and used while making 
decisions.  
 
3.2. Decision making strategy 
 
The strategy in [13] involves calculating the probability of mission failure at required points 
during the mission, usually when faults occur in the system or environmental conditions 
change. If the probability of mission failure becomes too high, then the future mission is 
considered to be too risky and an alternative mission configuration is used. The strategy is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 ± Decision Making Strategy 
 
There are two main parts in this approach ± diagnostics and prognostics. The objectives of the 
two methods and their interactions are explained later. The prognostics is the focus of this 
paper. During the diagnostics process the information about the status of the system is 
collected. The changes can be recorded as faults that occur on the system at component or 
subsystem level. Changes in environment conditions that affect the operation of the system, 
Mission 
Configuration 
DIAGNOSTICS 
(provide info about 
faults and other 
changes) 
PROGNOSTICS 
(Calculate Qi and 
QMISS) 
Is QMISS 
acceptable? 
N 
Y 
System/mission 
reconfiguration 
required 
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such as weather conditions or other approaching vehicles are also recorded. An important part 
of this information is successfully completed phases or tasks, confirming components or 
subsystems functioning successfully up to a certain time in the mission. During the 
prognostics process all the available information is used to calculate the probability of 
mission failure. A system reliability technique is employed  in this application, when failure 
probabilities are calculated for each phase in the mission and for the overall mission. The 
initial and updated probabilities are calculated in this part of the decision making process.  
 
The acceptable mission failure probability is defined before the predictions are obtained. If 
the initial or updated probabilities exceed the acceptable level of failure, the mission cannot 
be carried out in its current configuration. It could mean that the system still performs its 
mission task but in a different way in order to achieve the objective of the mission. 
Alternatively, the system can be reconfigured to achieve an alternative mission objective or 
the mission can be aborted and no further actions are performed. The scope of this work is to 
assume that mission configuration options are known and the most suitable one is chosen 
according to its failure probability. Therefore, if the decision of the autonomous vehicle is 
based on this information only, the mission is chosen which is the least likely to fail. 
However, in other applications, for example, military environment, different criteria might be 
more important. For example, UAV needs to hit a target in a set time, but is not required to 
land safely.   
 
In summary, for a defined mission the prognosis would be carried out before the start of the 
mission, calculating the initial failure probabilities of the original mission configuration. If the 
mission failure probability is acceptable, then the mission begins. During the mission the 
diagnostics tool collects the information about all the changes. Using the information 
available the prognostics tool calculates the updated failure probabilities and again checks 
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them against the acceptable limits. A mission reconfiguration takes place if the failure 
probability becomes too high.   
 
3.3. Requirements 
 
It is important to obtain the predictions quickly, especially when the decision making process 
relies on the speed of the prognosis. The ability to respond rapidly to changes in the status of 
the system and in the environmental conditions is an important requirement for the 
prognostics process. If autonomous vehicles are used, their decisions should be well-informed 
and made in a short time relying on the accurate information. This leads to two main 
requirements for the reliability-based prognosis ± accuracy and speed.  
  
When considering the reliability techniques available, fault trees provide an excellent way to 
represent the failure logic of each phase. However, when fault trees are used for the analysis, 
the kinetic tree theory [14] is not suitable to deliver the results required in the time available. 
The problem becomes even more complex when NOT logic [15] is incorporated in phase 
fault trees. Approximations are used to obtain mission failure probabilities. An alternative to 
fault trees can be used, known as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs), that express the failure 
logic function in a disjoint form. This property provides an efficient quantification process 
that can give exact values. Due to this advantage, BDDs are identified as suitable risk 
assessment tool for the real-time analysis of the system failure probability that is required in 
the decision making process of autonomous vehicles.      
 
4. Phased Mission Methodology for Autonomous Vehicles 
 
This section contains a description of a simple UAV mission, the overview of the phased 
mission methodology and its application to the example.  
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4.1. System and mission description 
 
Consider a simple UAV mission. The mission objective is to travel from airport A, perform a 
reconnaissance task while cruising above certain location and successfully return to airport A. 
A very simple view of the mission consists of three mission phases: take-off, cruise and 
landing. The task to be fulfilled by the UAV is considered as a part of cruise phase, since the 
surveillance is performed while cruising. All three phases must be successfully completed in 
order for the mission to be a success, i.e. the UAV performs a successful flight and completes 
the reconnaissance task. Each phase may only begin after the successful completion of 
previous phases.  
 
Simplified phase fault trees to illustrate the concepts are shown in Figure 3. These formulate 
the failure logic F i for each phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Fault trees of F1, F2 and F3 for the example system 
 
Take-off 
Failure (F1) 
SYS2 SYS3 
SYS1 X G1 
SYS2 SYS3 
SYS6 X G1 
Landing 
Failure (F3) 
SYS4 SYS5 
Cruise 
Failure (F2) 
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The failure of take-off phase is defined as the failure of subsystem SYS1, or the failure of the 
two redundant subsystems SYS2 and SYS3, or the occurrence of external factor X. This factor 
X can be poor weather conditions, for example, strong rain or blizzard, that would prevent the 
take-off of the aircraft. The cruise phase fails if one of the two subsystems SYS4 or SYS5 fail, 
where SYS4 is needed to retain the capability to fly and SYS5 handles the surveillance 
capability. The landing fault tree is very similar to the take-off fault tree, where the 
occurrence of external factor X, the failure of subsystem SYS6 or the failure of the two 
redundant subsystems SYS2 and SYS3 can prevent the landing. Clearly these fault trees are 
very much smaller than for a real problem but are sufficient to demonstrate the concepts.  
 
While operating the autonomous vehicle, it is important that the UAV makes rational 
decisions to preserve the safety of the flight and achieve the mission success in the event of 
component or sub-system failures or the occurrence of external events. For example, if the 
surveillance equipment fails, it fails the cruise phase in the current mission configuration. In 
the alternative configuration the UAV could be required to perform a different objective or 
follow a different route. The following section gives an overview of the phased mission 
methodology for autonomous systems and its application to the UAV example.  
 
4.2. Mission planning methodology and its implementation 
 
The reliability-based method and its application to the mission planning strategy is presented 
step-by-step: 
x Convert phase fault trees, each of them representing failure logic in the phase, to 
BDDs 
x Calculate initial phase and mission failure probabilities 
x Once the new information (failures, event occurrence) is available, update phase and 
mission failure probabilities  
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x If the failure probability exceeds the defined limit, reconfiguration of the mission is 
considered 
 
Each step of the methodology is explained in more detail, in the context of its application for 
the simple UAV example in the following sections.  
 
4.2.1 Fault tree to BDD conversion 
 
Once the mission is defined, the methodology starts by converting phase fault trees to BDDs. 
The well-known ite technique [4] can be used for this purpose. When large systems are 
considered, the conversion process can be time consuming, therefore, in order to minimise the 
time taken for the analysis this part of the methodology can be done off-line. In this case, the 
most compact BDD representation can be achieved beforehand, applying different component 
ordering schemes that can affect the size of the resulting BDD. Building BDDs before the 
start of the mission fulfils the requirements of the efficiency in the speed of analysis.     
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 ± BDDs of F1, F2 and F3 for the example system 
  
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
F3: 
SYS2 
1 
1 
0 
SYS6 
X 
1 
1 0 
0 SYS3 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
F1: 
SYS2 
1 
1 
0 
SYS1 
X 
1 
1 0 
0 SYS3 
1 0 
F2: 
1 
1 
0 
SYS5 
SYS4 
1 0 
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For example, the three orderings have been assigned for the phase fault trees, shown in Figure 
3, i.e. for the take-off phase the variable ordering X < SYS1 < SYS2 < SYS3 is assigned, for the 
cruise phase ± SYS4 < SYS5 and for the landing phase ± X < SYS6 < SYS2 < SYS3. The BDDs 
obtained are shown in Figure 4.  
 
These BDDs can now be used in the quantification process.  
 
4.2.2. Calculation of initial phase and mission failure probabilities 
 
The quantification process is based on the method presented in [11] where a detailed 
explanation of the method is given. The BDDs representing the failure in phase i given 
VXFFHVVIXOFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHSUHFHGLQJSKDVHV«i-1, Phi, are used in this process.  
 
First of all, the start and end times of each phase are required, the start time of phase i is 
denoted by ti-1 and the end time of phase i is denoted by ti. The start time of phase i is equal to 
the end time of phase i-1. For the simplicity, assume that ti = i. For example, phase I starts (as 
well as the whole mission) at time t0 = 0 and it ends at time t1 = 1.  
 
After that, it is necessary to associate the time interval for each node, which identifies the 
time period over which the event can occur in order for it to contribute to phase i failure 
represented by the BDD of F i. The time dependent indexes are assigned to each node in the 
phase BDDs, as it is shown in Figure 5. 
 
In this representation, the first index is the start time of the mission and the second index is 
the end time of the current phase. This applies to system variables, denoted by SYSi. The only 
external factor variable has the first index representing the start time of the current phase, but 
not the beginning of the mission, since external factor can independently happen in any of the 
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phases. The BDDs in Figure 5 encode the failure logic of each phase taking into account the 
time intervals over which the variables can contribute to phase failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 ± BDDs of F1, F2 and F3 with time dependent indexes 
 
In the quantification process BDDs representing Phi are used. A BDD for Phi is obtained by 
calculating the conjunction of the BDDs representing the success in all the previous phases 
and the BDD of F i for the current phase i. The BDD representing Ph1 is equivalent to the 
BDD representing F1, shown in Figure 5, since it has no preceding phases. The BDD 
representing Ph2 is obtained by applying the AND operation between the two BDDs, i.e. the 
BDD of the success in its only one preceding phase 1 and the BDD of F2. The first of the two 
BDDs is obtained from F1 by replacing the 1 terminal nodes by the 0 terminal nodes and 
replacing the 0 terminal nodes by the 1 terminal nodes. Then a simple connection of the two 
BDDs is performed. During the AND operation between the two BDDs, the second BDD is 
connected on every available 1 terminal node of the first BDD. No global variable ordering is 
required in this process. The two resulting BDDs representing the Ph2 and Ph3 are shown in 
Figure 6.  
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
F3: 
SYS2
0,3 
1 
1 
0 
SYS6
0,3 
X2,3 
1 
1 0 
0 SYS3
0,3 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
F1: 
SYS2
0,1 
1 
1 
0 
SYS1 
0,1 
X0,1 
1 
1 0 
0 SYS3
0,1 
1 0 
F2: 
1 
1 
0 
SYS4 
0,2 
1 0 
SYS5
0,2 
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Figure 6 ± BDDs of Ph2 and Ph3 
 
In each of those BDDs all paths from the root vertex to terminal vertex 1 are traced in order to 
express the conditions of phase failure in a simplified form used in the quantification of phase 
and mission failure probability. Paths that cause failure of a phase are listed below.  
 
Phase I: 
1. 1,0X  
2. 1,01,0 1SYSX  
3. 1,01,01,01,0 321 SYSSYSSYSX  
(7) 
 
1 0 
1 
0 
1 0 
Ph2: 
SYS2
0,1 
1 
0 
0 
SYS1 
0,1 
X0,1 
0 
0 
SYS3
0,1 
1 0 
1 
1 
0 
SYS4 
0,2 
1 0 
SYS5
0,2 
1 0 
1 
0 
1 0 
Ph3: 
SYS2 
0,1 
1 
0 
0 
SYS1 
0,1 
X0,1 
0 
0 
SYS3 
0,1 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
SYS2 
0,3 
1 
1 
0 
SYS6 
0,3 
X2,3 
1 
1 0 
0 SYS3 
0,3 
1 0 
1 
0 
0 
SYS4 
0,2 
0 
SYS5 
0,2 
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Phase II: 
1. 2,01,01,01,01,0 4321 SYSSYSSYSSYSX  
2. 2,02,01,01,01,01,0 54321 SYSSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
3. 2,01,01,01,0 421 SYSSYSSYSX  
4. 2,02,01,01,01,0 5421 SYSSYSSYSSYSX  
(8) 
Phase III: 
1. 3,22,02,01,01,01,01,0 54321 XSYSSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
2. 3,03,22,02,01,01,01,01,0 654321 SYSXSYSSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
3. o3,03,03,03,22,02,01,01,01,01,0 32654321 SYSSYSSYSXSYSSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
3,03,22,02,03,11,01,01,0 654321 SYSXSYSSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
4. 3,22,02,01,01,01,0 5421 XSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
5. 3,03,22,02,01,01,01,0 65421 SYSXSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
6. o3,03,03,03,22,02,01,01,01,0 3265421 SYSSYSSYSXSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
3,03,03,22,02,03,11,01,0 365421 SYSSYSXSYSSYSSYSSYSX  
(9) 
 
Paths 3 and 6 of phase III are simplified, removing the overlapping intervals of repeated 
occurrences of variables. The general rules for the simplification of paths are shown in [11] 
and are also described below. They simplify the time intervals associated with variables that 
occur more than once along the path to be quantified. This is where the dependencies between 
phase variables are addressed. 
 
If system component k is considered, then:   
)),min(),,(max(),().,( 21212211 jjiikjikjik ttttxttxttx   (10) 
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where ),( jik ttx  is the binary indicator variable and ji tt  , 
®¯­ 
otherwise.,0
,  time to  timefrom fails componentif,1),( jijik
ttk
ttx  (11) 
In this notation the working state of component ),( 0 jk ttx  is equivalent to ),( fjk tx , i.e. the 
fact that component k has not failed from the beginning of the mission until time tj is 
equivalent to the fact that component k fails some time after tj. In the example, equation (10) 
is applied resulting in the simplification 3,13,01,0 333 SYSSYSSYS   in expression (9).  
 
If external factor X is considered, no simplification rules are applied, as shown in expression 
(9).  
 
The phase failure probability Qi is obtained by summing the probabilities of each path, for 
example, for phase I, Q1 is calculated as shown below: 
    ³³³³ f 1
0
1
01
1,0
1
0
1,01,0
)()()(1)(1 32111
t
t
t
tt
X
t
t
XX dttfdttfdttfqdttfqqQ  (12) 
where 
1,0X
q is the failure probability of external factor X in the time period from t0 to t1, and fk 
is the failure probability density function for sub-system SYSk. 
 
Finally, by summing the phase failure probabilities the overall mission failure probability is 
obtained, i.e. 
.321 QQQQMISS   (13) 
This concludes the initial failure probability calculation. 
 
 19 
 Updating failure probabilities and reconfiguration 
 
Once the mission is in progress, the failure probability is updated taking into account new 
information about the changes in the system or in the environment. The BDDs representing 
Phi are updated taking into account the current states of components or subsystems. The 
updated mission failure probability is then checked against the acceptable limit.  
 
For example, after the successful completion of the take-off phase, the failure probabilities for 
the future phases are updated. Using equation (5) the updated probabilities are: 
1
2
12 1 Q
QQ   and 1
3
13 1 Q
QQ   (14) 
13121 QQQMISS  . (15) 
 
When failures occur they can affect the future phases. For example, the failure of subsystem 
SYS5, that ensures the surveillance capability results in the cruise phase failure. If this failure 
occurs in the take-off phase this phase will be completed successfully, but on entering the 
cruise phase, the phase failure will occur, as well as the overall mission failure. However, if 
this prognosis is available for the decision making process, an alternative mission objective 
could be achieved, avoiding to use the failed subsystem, even if this is, for this simplified 
mission an abandonment and return to base. As another example, if, while the UAV is in 
cruise phase, poor weather conditions arise, i.e. component X occurs, and the landing phase 
failure probability increases so much that the UAV is unable to land safely, then it either 
changes the course and lands in a different airport or if possible cruises while the weather 
conditions improve.  
 
For simple systems like that phase fault trees are small and their analysis can be easily 
performed. However, it can be time consuming to convert large fault trees to BDDs, 
 20 
especially if the ordering scheme is unsuitable. Also, when the number of phases in the 
mission increases, the number of paths for the quantification process also increases and the 
analysis can take too long, especially in real-time applications. A way to improve the 
efficiency is to reduce the size of the problem without loosing the required complexity. 
Therefore, phase fault trees can be reduced prior to the BDD conversion process. The 
modularisation method applied to phase fault trees is presented in the following section. 
 
5. Phase fault tree modularisation 
 
This modularisation method simplifies original fault trees, reducing the representation of the 
failure logic and identifying independent subtrees, whose solution is equivalent to the original 
fault tree. These independent modules can be analysed separately and then the results 
combined to give the overall result. The modularisation algorithm is presented in [9]. In the 
phased mission analysis this method is applied to phase fault trees, as shown below. After the 
modularisation is applied, the subtrees are converted to BDDs, which are analysed separately 
and then the results are combined to obtain the failure probability of the phase. In the phased 
mission analysis the subtrees, that appear in more than one phase, are converted to BDDs only 
once and then the expression is reused as many times as required during the quantification 
process. In phased mission it is common to have sub-systems whose failure affect the failure 
of each phase. For example, for the UAV mission an obvious example of such a system is the 
fuel system, whose failure would stop engines working in any phase. If a part of fault tree 
corresponding to a sub-system failure can be analysed independently, its size will have a 
smaller impact on the overall size of phase BDD, i.e. a smaller number of paths need to be 
visited, than during the analysis of BDDs without modules.  
 
A module of a fault tree is a subtree that is completely independent from the rest of the tree. It 
contains no basic events that appear elsewhere in the fault tree. This definition from [9] is 
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extended for the phased mission analysis. In this case such modules are independent from the 
rest of the fault tree of the current phase and the other phases. As such, the module in a fault 
tree can be extracted only after all phase fault trees are taken into account.  
 
The modules can be identified using the linear-time algorithm of Dutuit and Rauzy which 
traverses the fault trees twice. Following this algorithm gates G1 and Phase II are identified as 
modules. The other two gates cannot be modules since they contain repeated gates and events. 
The modularised phase fault trees are shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 ± Modularised phase fault trees for F1, F2 and F3 and modules M1 and M2 
 
 
Now the modularised fault trees are converted to BDDs, as shown in Figure 8. After that the 
BDDs for Ph1, Ph2 and Ph3 are created in the way, described in section 4.2.2. Those BDDs 
are shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 8 ± BDDs for F1, F2 and F3 and modules M1 and M2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 ± BDDs of Ph1, Ph2 and Ph3 and modules M1 and M2 
 
The quantitative analysis is performed on the set of BDDs in Figure 9 to obtain the failure 
probability for each phase. The number of paths for the quantitative analysis is reduced using 
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the modularised phase fault trees instead of the original phase fault trees, as it is shown 
below.  
 
A better efficiency can be achieved when the probability of a module failure is calculated 
only once when module appears more than once in the phase fault trees. Using single modular 
event in the BDD to present the failure logic of the subsystem reduces the number of paths in 
the quantification process. Also, the same BDD is used to calculate module failure probability 
in different time intervals. For example, if 
1,01 ttM
q
 
and 
2,01 ttM
q  are required, the same BDD of 
module M1 in Figure 8 is traversed twice for the evaluation. Calculating 
1,01 ttM
q  for nodes in 
the BDD the time of failure is taken from time t0 to time t1, and calculating 
2,01 ttM
q  the time of 
failure is taken from time t0 to time t2. Then those probabilities can be used to obtain the 
module failure probabilities in different interval, i.e. 
 
itjtjtit MMM
qqq
,0,0,
 . (16) 
This increases the efficiency of the analysis, since the structure of the module does not need 
to be visited again. 
 
For example, for phase III there are only 3 paths using the modularised fault trees in 
comparison to 6 paths using the original fault trees. 
 
Phase III: 
1. 3,22,01,01,01,0 211 XMMSYSX  
2. 3,03,22,01,01,01,0 6211 SYSXMMSYSX  
3. o3,03,03,22,01,01,01,0 16211 MSYSXMMSYSX  
3,03,22,03,11,01,0 6211 SYSXMMSYSX . 
(17) 
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In this case, 
1,01M
q
 
can be calculated traversing the BDD of module M1 and then reusing it as 
many times as needed. Also, the same BDD can be used to calculate the probability of 
module failure at any other time during the mission. As shown in equation (16): 
1,03,03,1 111 MMM qqq  . (18) 
Therefore, the phase III failure probability is calculated as: 
)(
3,03,23,22,01,01,01,0 62111 SYSXXMMSYSX qpqppppQ   
3,03,22,03,11,01,0 6211 SYSXMMSYSX pppqpp . 
(19) 
Finally, using equation (4) the overall mission failure probability is obtained.  
 
The efficiency of the modularisation technique in the phased mission analysis was tested 
using an example UAV mission that consists of 13 phases and the complexity of phase fault 
trees is given in Table 1.  
Phase Number of gates Number of basic events Number of modules 
I 1 3 0 
II 19 20 6 
III 20 19 6 
IV 18 20 6 
V 18 18 6 
VI 20 21 6 
VII 19 19 6 
VIII 18 17 6 
IX 19 20 6 
X 19 19 6 
XI 18 21 6 
XII 18 17 6 
XIII 1 2 0 
 
Table 1 ± UAV mission for the efficiency analysis 
 
Phase fault trees are medium sized, number of gates and number of events given in columns 2 
and 3 respectively. Column 4 shows number of modules identified in each phase. During the 
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test number of nodes in the phase BDDs, number of paths to quantify and time taken to 
perform the analysis were recorded and given in Table 2, column 1, 2 and 3 respectively.    
 
Table 2 ± Test results using the non-modularised and modularised phase fault trees 
 
The efficiency of the analysis improved a lot after modules were identified. The number of 
paths was reduced dramatically, since some complex parts of a BDD were replaced by a 
single node representing a modular event. Due to this, the speed of the analysis has increased 
a lot.  
 
The efficiency of the modularisation technique in the phased mission modelling depends on 
how common modules are in phase fault trees. It is likely that a system undergoing a phased 
mission will have some subsystems whose failure contributes to each phase failure in the 
same way, as it was discussed in the example above. Therefore, the identification of 
independent modules of those contributions and their implementation in the method proposed, 
increases the speed of the analysis. This improvement is especially important if the 
methodology is required to support the decision making process in real time. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
A reliability-based methodology employing BDDs has been developed for the phased mission 
analysis. It forms the base of a prognostics tool used in a mission planning strategy of 
autonomous vehicles. The methodology takes into account changing environmental 
 Number of nodes Number of paths Time of analysis 
Without modularisation 5359 15212924 12.36 
With modularisation 2807 116452 0.03 
Decrease (%) 47.62 99.24 99.76 
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conditions and failures that occur on the system. The updated phase and mission failure 
likelihood can support real-time decision making process. The speed of the analysis is 
improved by employing the modularisation technique, where smaller BDDs are obtained and 
can be analysed quickly.  
 
The phased mission methodology can be applied as a prognostics tool in the mission planning 
of autonomous vehicles. This contribution is particularly important when the mission failure 
probability is revaluated throughout the mission according to fault diagnostics information 
and can be used as a part of the decision making strategy. The methodology has been 
successfully demonstrated on the ASTRAEA project.  
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